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ABSTRACT
Current laws related to intellectual property (IP) protection,
especially those meant for protecting copyrights and trade secrets,
afford certain strong protections for software programs. However,
all IP laws have their limits set by legislators purposefully, to
maintain a sound balance between private monopoly rights and
public interest. To deal with these limits, software companies
frequently include certain restrictive provisions in software enduser licensing terms. The anti-reverse engineering clause is a typical
example of companies’ efforts to supplement IP protections for
software programs. The enforceability of these terms is a critical
issue because they disrupt the balance intended by IP laws. This
Article discusses the position of China on the enforceability of antireverse engineering clauses and finds that the Chinese position is
too uncertain. By drawing on insights and policy considerations
from the United States and European Union positions, this Article
argues that the one-size-fits-all approach is inadequate for China
and that an intermediate approach would be a more appropriate
alternative. Specifically, it contends that the Chinese law should be
reformed to include clear provisions allowing limited contractual
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bans but disallowing total bans on reverse engineering programs.
Moreover, a miscellaneous provision should be included to address
the rapid development of this industry and deal with an
unpredictable future landscape.
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INTRODUCTION

“You are not allowed to copy, modify, distribute, sell, or lease
any part of the software, or to reverse-engineer or attempt to
extract the source code of that software, unless laws prohibit
these restrictions or you have YouTube’s written
permission.”
—YouTube Terms of Service1
“You may not: . . . make copies, modify, adapt, translate,
reverse engineer, disassemble, decompile or create any derivative
works based on the Services, including any files, tables or
documentation (or any portion thereof) or determine or
attempt to determine any source code, algorithms, methods
or techniques embodied in the Platform or any derivative
works thereof unless any such activities are expressly
authorised by us in advance.”
—TikTok Terms of Service2
“(6) the term ‘improper means’ — . . . (B) does not include
reverse engineering, independent derivation, or any other
lawful means of acquisition.”
—2016 Defend Trade Secrets Act3
Twitter, TikTok, Facebook, and YouTube are all examples of
application software programs used by millions across the globe on
computers or phones. As valuable intangible assets of companies
around the world, software programs are unique subject matters for
IP protection. They are normally distributed in the form of object
code, consisting only of strings of ones and zeros, which may only
be read by machines.4 Object code, however, is transformed from
1
Terms
of
Service,
YOUTUBE,
https://www.youtube.com/static?template=terms
[https://perma.cc/CUK6ZL5A] (last visited Jan. 25, 2022) (emphasis added).
2
Terms of Service, Art. 5, 7, TIKTOK, https://www.tiktok.com/legal/terms-ofservice?lang=en [https://perma.cc/U8K8-N8HV] (last visited Jan. 25, 2022) (first
emphasis added).
3
Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, § 2(b)(6)(B), 130 Stat.
376, 381 (emphasis added).
4
Scott Wallask, source code, TECHTARGET (updated Sept. 2019),
https://searchapparchitecture.techtarget.com/definition/source-code
[https://perma.cc/GJ83-MS7C]; Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law
and Economics of Reverse Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575, 1608 (2002).
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the source code which is written by programmers using computer
languages like python, C++, and Java.5 The process of transforming
the source code to the object code is called compilation. 6 While
software companies distribute the object code when licensing
programs to end users, they keep the source code secret and
unpublished, since it contains valuable information of the software
program.7 To protect software programs, especially the embedded
source code, from copying or misappropriation by others,
companies consistently rely on IP laws for protection.8
Software programs are eligible for different forms of IP
protection (e.g., trade secrets, copyright, and patents), as long as
they satisfy the corresponding requirements.9 For example, Article
10 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS) considers computer programs as
copyrightable literary works whether they are in source or object
code. 10 All IP rights, however, have their contours and limits,
functioning to balance private monopoly rights and public interest.
Patents cannot extend protection to abstract ideas, and copyright
only protects expression rather than underlying ideas, while trade
secrets law does not prevent proper means, such as reverse
engineering and independent development. 11 Recognizing the
5
See Daniel Lin, Matthew Sag & Ronald S. Laurie, Source Code Versus Object
Code: Patent Implications for the Open Source Community, 18 SANTA CLARA COMPUT. &
HIGH TECH. L.J. 235, 238-39 (2002); Samuel J. LaRoque, Reverse Engineering and Trade
Secrets in the Post-Alice World, 66 U. KANSAS L. REV. 427, 430 (2017).
6
See, e.g., Lin et al., supra note 5, at 238.
7
See Wallask, supra note 4; LaRoque, supra note 5, at 431.
8
See, e.g., LaRoque, supra note 5, at 431-35 (discussing how software
companies use patent, copyright, and trade secrets to protect their software
programs).
9
See generally David Bender, Trade Secret Protection of Software, 38 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 909 (1970) (arguing that state trade secrets law provides a feasible and
optimal form of protection for software programs); David Bender, Protection of
Computer Programs: The Copyright/Trade Secret Interface, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 907 (1986)
(discussing whether it is proper for software programs to get benefits of both
copyright and trade secrets protection); Michael Risch, Hidden in Plain Sight, 31
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1635, 1638-52 (2016) (contending that copyright and patent
protection leave significant gaps in protecting software programs which can be
filled by trade secrets protection); LaRoque, supra note 5, at 431-37 (addressing the
current limits of patent and copyright protection for software programs and the
possibility of protecting them under trade secrets law).
10
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 10,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
11
See, e.g., Risch, supra note 9.
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limits inherent in IP laws, many software companies have turned to
contract law to supplement protections for their software
programs.12 Anti-reverse engineering clauses are one such example.
Reverse engineering of software programs is the process of
decompiling, or disassembling, the distributed object code to figure
out the source code.13 Through this process, reverse engineers can
“discern or deduce internal design details of the program” to
develop a new program for interoperability or to further
competitive economic interests.14 For example, reverse engineering
software products requires computer engineers to translate the
object code back to the corresponding source code.15 This is referred
to as “disassembly” or “decompilation.” 16 To deter attempts at
reverse engineering, many technology companies from different
countries such as the United States, China, and European Union
(“EU”) members include anti-reverse engineering clauses in their
click-wrap licensing agreements. 17 The goal of such contractual
language is to prevent end-users from reverse engineering,
decompiling, and disassembling the software object code, regardless
12
See David A. Rice, Public Goods, Private Contract and Public Policy: Federal
Preemption of Software License Prohibitions Against Reverse Engineering, 53 U. PITT. L.
REV. 543, 547-48 (1992); Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & Robert Taylor, Set in Stone?
Change and Innovation in Consumer Standard-Form Contracts, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 240,
257 (2013) (using empirical data to show that, during the tested period, the End
User License Agreements of software companies have increased contractual
restrictions in users’ ability to modify the program, create derivative works, and
reverse engineer the software); Deepa Varadarajan, The Trade Secret-Contract
Interface, 103 IOWA L. REV. 1543, 1569-70 (2018).
13
See Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 4, at 1608-09.
14
See Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 4, at 1608-09.
15
See LaRoque, supra note 5, at 438-39.
16
LaRoque, supra note 5, at 438-39.
17
See, e.g., LaRoque, supra note 5, at 441 (offering examples from the United
States). For examples from China, see Agreement on Software License and Service of
Tencent
Weixin,
art.
8.2.1.2,
WECHAT,
https://weixin.qq.com/cgibin/readtemplate?lang=en&t=weixin_agreement&s=default&cc=CN
[https://perma.cc/8XV9-U3RS] (last visited Jan. 22, 2022); Douyin End User License
Agreement,
art.
5.1.2(9),
ECHINALAW.NET,
http://www.echinalaw.net/platform/2021/0720/324.html
[https://perma.cc/MK3X-F43N] (last visited Feb. 8, 2022) (Douyin is a Chinese
version of Tiktok); Alipay End User License Agreement and Terms of Service, art. 4.3,
ALIPAY (last updated Dec. 12, 2021), https://render.alipay.com/p/f/fdiztokkhz/index.html [https://perma.cc/9UJS-PD5D]. For examples from EU
members, see Christopher Maierhöfer & Roksana Hosseini, Contractual Prohibition
of Reverse Engineering under the New German Trade Secrets Act—a Practical Guide, BIRD
&
BIRD
(Jan.
13,
2020),
https://www.twobirds.com/en/news/articles/2020/germany/vertraglicherausschluss-von-reverse-engineering [https://perma.cc/92QH-ZZY6].
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of whether IP laws reach such conduct. 18 Many rising Chinese
technology companies have included these terms in their licensing
agreements since Chinese law fails to provide clear guidance on the
enforceability issue.19 To access the software, the end users must
affirmatively accept these restrictions.20 Therefore, every user of the
software is subject to this contractual restriction, notwithstanding
the enforceability issue.
If enforceable, the anti-reverse engineering clauses enable
software companies to preclude users from “hijacking” ideas that
are not otherwise subject to copyright laws or trade secrets
underlying the software. This strengthens the monopoly rights of
companies that circumvent the limits of IP rights. Such an extension
of IP rights through contract law, however, may disrupt the
legislatively designed balance between private rights and the public
interest. As Chinese law remains uncertain about whether these
terms are enforceable, 21 there is a high risk that this common
practice adopted by Chinese software companies may disrupt the
private-public balance in China. Accordingly, it is important to
explore whether these clauses are enforceable and whether they
should be upheld in China. This Article focuses on two main
questions:
(1) under current Chinese law, can anti-reverse
engineering clauses be enforced; and (2) if so, should these clauses be
enforced, considering their impact on the public interest? This
Article discusses these questions mainly under the Chinese context.
It will compare the positions of China, the United States, and the EU.
Through comparative analysis, it strives to provide reform
suggestions to clarify the Chinese position on the enforceability
issue. This Article is structured as follows: Part II will briefly
introduce the current IP protections for software programs and
identify the gaps existing in these protections, which software
companies use anti-reverse engineering clauses to fill; Part III will
then analyze the legal treatment of these restrictive clauses under
the Chinese law to demonstrate the uncertainty problem of the
Chinese position; Part IV will conduct the comparative analysis by
See Marotta-Wurgler & Taylor, supra note 12, at 257.
See infra Part III.
20
See,
e.g.,
Terms
of
Service,
Art.
2,
TIKTOK,
https://www.tiktok.com/legal/terms-of-service?lang=en
[https://perma.cc/U8K8-N8HV] (“By accessing or using our Services, you confirm
that you can form a binding contract with TikTok, that you accept these Terms and
that you agree to comply with them.”).
21
See infra Part IV.
18
19
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discussing the U.S. and EU positions on this enforceability issue;
based on the comparative analysis in Part IV, Part V of this Article
will offer suggestions for China’s future reform on this issue.
II. IP PROTECTION FOR SOFTWARE PROGRAMS IN CHINA
Software programs may satisfy the requirements of all IP rights,
such as copyright, patents, and trade secrets. Companies can choose
to protect their programs through copyright, trade secrets, patents,
or a combination thereof. 22 This Part will briefly introduce the
copyright and trade secrets protection for software programs. It will
also discuss the inherent limits set on these IP protections by
lawmakers to strike the balance between facilitating economic
incentives for innovation and the public’s interest in accessing
digital information. This Part will also introduce the copyright and
trade secrets policies of China. However, it will not discuss patent
law because Chinese patent law does not exempt reverse
engineering from infringement. 23
Therefore, anti-reverse
engineering clauses will not change the rights granted by patent law
to software companies, regardless of whether these clauses are
enforceable in China. Copyright and trade secrets are more relevant
to the topic, as they are normally used together to protect software
programs. Moreover, to a certain extent, copyright and trade secrets
allow reverse engineering of software programs.
a.

Copyright Protection and Reverse Engineering

In China, technology companies can protect their software
programs through copyright law. Chinese law on software
protection is remarkably similar to U.S. law, which makes it clear
22
See Risch, supra note 9 (discussing the copyright, patent, and trade secrets
protection for software programs); Bender, Protection of Computer Programs: The
Copyright/Trade Secret Interface, supra note 9, at 910 (discussing that many companies
use copyright together with trade secret to protect software programs).
23
See, e.g., FENG XIAOQING, ZHISHI CHANQUAN FA (知识产权法) [INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW] 232-36 (2015) (noting that under Chinese Patent Law, reverse
engineering is not one of the exceptions for patent infringement); cf. the U.S.
position in Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 160 (1989)
(noting that the right to prohibit reverse engineering was “one of the rights vested
in the federal patent holder, but has never been a part of state protection . . . .”).
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that software programs fall under the ambit of copyright law.24 The
similarity is a result of the U.S.-China Intellectual Property
Negotiation (1989), where the Chinese government committed to
providing copyright protection for software programs.25 Under U.S.
pressure, the first People’s Republic of China (PRC) Copyright Law
was enacted in 1990.26 Article 3(8) explicitly recognized computer
software as works that can enjoy copyright rights. 27 This Article
remains intact in the version of the PRC Copyright Law amended in
2020.28 Moreover, the PRC State Council promulgated a specialized
regulation about software program protection (hereinafter
“Regulation on Computers Software Protection”), adding specific
details to the PRC Copyright Law.29 Combined, software programs
are protected mainly by copyright in China.
Copyright law, however, can provide software programs only
limited protection. While granting inventors copyright protection
can facilitate their incentives to create, over-broad rights may harm
the public interest in using the information.30 Thus, to retain a sound
Rice, supra note 12, at 573.
See U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, FACT SHEET: “SPECIAL 301” ON INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY
4
(1989),
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/1989%20Special%20301%20Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/L4PV-TSLM]; see also Zhang Jiyu (张吉豫), Ruanjian Fanxiang
Gongcheng De Hefaxing Ji Lifa Jianyi (软件反向工程的合法性及立法建议) [The
Legitimate Issue of Reverse Engineering Software Programs and Legislative
Suggestions], Zhongguo Faxue (中国法学) [4 CHINA LEGAL SCI. 54, 54-55 (2013)].
26
See id.
27
Zhuzuoquan Fa (著作权法) [Copyright Law] (promulgated by Standing
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 7, 1990, effective June 1, 1991), art. 3(8),
https://www-pkulawcom.pennlaw.idm.oclc.org/en_law/59d1a94a76038c6cbdfb.html
[https://perma.cc/KK5J-B9EA].
28
Zhuzuoquan Fa (著作权法) [Copyright Law] (promulgated by Standing
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 7, 1990, effective June. 1, 1991, revised by
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Nov. 11, 2020, effective June 1, 2021), art.
3(8),
https://www-pkulawcom.pennlaw.idm.oclc.org/en_law/a3b3a54bea64f090bdfb.html
[https://perma.cc/R65D-FKBH].
29
Jisuanji Ruanjian Baohu Tiaoli ( 计 算 机 软 件 保 护 条 例 ) [Regulation on
Computers Software Protection] (promulgated by State Council, Jan. 4, 1991,
effective Oct. 1, 1991, amended by State Council, Jan. 30, 2013, effective Mar. 1,
2013),
https://www-pkulawcom.pennlaw.idm.oclc.org/en_law/41841820b1a1b74abdfb.html
[https://perma.cc/PP9Y-N5PB].
30
See, e.g., Rebecca Tushnet, Intellectual Property as a Public Interest Mechanism,
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 95-100 (Rochelle
Dreyfuss & Justine Pila eds., 2017); Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law:
Doctrine in Search of Justification, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 241, 248 (1998).
24
25
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balance between private rights and public interest, the copyright
system has certain built-in limitations. First, copyright protection
does not extend to ideas underlying software; it protects only the
original expressions in the code. 31 Second, copyright excludes
functionality, which is reserved for patents and trade secrets,32 thus
implying that copyright law does not protect any functional
components of works. This is relevant to software because software
is inherently functional. 33 Thus, certain elements in software
programs may not receive copyright protection due to their
functionality.34 Meanwhile, copyright law has an important built-in
ex post limiting mechanism—the fair use doctrine. This doctrine
exempts putatively infringing uses from liability if they are deemed
fair. 35 This limiting doctrine is relevant to software programs
because the Chinese law recognizes certain reverse engineering
conduct as fair use.36 While the current PRC Copyright Law does
not permit or prohibit reverse engineering software programs for
any other purposes under the copyright law, 37 Article 17 of the
31
See WANGQIAN (王迁), ZHISHI CHANQUAN FA JIAOCHENG (知识产权法教程)
[INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW TUTORIAL] 45 (6th ed. 2019); cf. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b)
(2012) (indicating that copyright protection under U.S. law does not “extend to any
idea . . . regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or
embodied . . . .”); Deepa Varadarajan, Trade Secret Fair Use, 83 FORDHAM L. REV.
1401, 1427 (2014) (explaining that in the United States, copyright protection
“extends only to the author’s original expression of a work, not to the underlying
ideas, facts, or functional elements of a work”); TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9, at
art. 9 (“Copyright protection shall extend to expressions and not to ideas,
procedures, methods of operation or mathematical concepts . . . .”).
32
See WANGQIAN, supra note 31, at 55-56; cf. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012)
(excluding processes and other functional elements from copyright protection in
the United States); Varadarajan, supra note 31, at 1427 (indicating exclusion of
functional elements from copyright protection in the United States); Risch, supra
note 9, at 1646 (contrasting copyright with trade secret law in the United States,
which can protect functional elements).
33
See Pamela Samuelson, Randall Davis, Mitchell D. Kapor & J.H. Reichman,
Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV.
2308, 2320-24 (1994).
34
See WANGQIAN, supra note 31, at 55-56; Risch, supra note 8, at 1640-41, 1646.
35
Varadarajan, supra note 31, at 1428; Zhuzuoquan Fa (著作权法), supra note
28, at art. 24.
36
See supra notes 34-35; infra notes 37-41.
37
The 2020 Amendment of PRC Copyright Law does not include a clause
specifically allowing reverse engineering clauses, although the previous published
draft of the new Copyright Law included a clause allowing reverse engineering for
interoperability. See Zhang Jiyu (张吉豫), Ruanjian Jiekou Daima Kezhuzuoxing
Yanjiu (软件接口代码可著作权性研究-兼评《著作权法》第三次修改草案“反向工程
条款”) [Research on the Copyright of Software Interface Code—Comment on the
Draft of the Third Revision of the “Copyright Law Reverse Engineering Clause”],
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Regulation on Computers Software Protection allows end users to
study and research licensed software programs. 38 According to
many authors, this can be interpreted as allowing reverse
engineering programs for study and research purposes. 39 This
clause can also be interpreted as allowing reverse engineering
programs for interoperability.40 In sum, the copyright law in China
allows for the reverse engineering of software programs under
certain, specified circumstances. These limits are included in the
copyright law to justify granting monopoly rights to private parties.
To overcome these protection limits and to supplement copyright
protection for software programs, many parties look to trade
secrets.41
b.

Trade Secret Protection and Reverse Engineering

The Anti-Unfair Competition Law (AUCL) and its
corresponding judicial interpretations constitute the main sources of
trade secret protection in China.42 The trade secrets law in China has
Jilin Daxue Shehui Kexue Xuebao (吉林大学社会科学学报) [53 JILIN UNIV. J. SOC. SCI.
EDITION 91, 91-92 (2013)]. The new Copyright Law, however, only allows
circumventing technological measures to reverse engineer for research purposes.
Regulation on Computers Software Protection, supra note 29, at art. 17. Thus, it
actually remains uncertain whether reverse engineering software programs for
interoperability is allowed in Chinese Copyright Law and for other purposes.
38
Regulation on Computers Software Protection, supra note 29, at art. 17.
39
See e.g., Zhang Jiyu, supra note 37, at 60; Caowei (曹伟), Ruanjian Fanxiang
Gongcheng: Heli Liyong Yu Jieguo Guanzhi (软件反向工程：合理利用与结果管制)
[Reverse Engineering Software Programs: Fair Use and Result Regulation], Z HISHI
CHANQUAN (知识产权) [4 INTELL. PROP. 23 (2011)].
40
See e.g., QueZipeng ( 阙紫鹏), Shehui Chuangxin He Hetong Ziyou De
Boyi—Lun Ruanjian Xuke Xieyi Zhong Jinzhi Fanxiang Gongcheng Tiaokuan De
Xiaoli (社会创新和合同自由的博弈—论软件许可协议中禁止反向工程条款的效力)
[Battles Between Society Innovation and Freedom of Contract—Research on the
Enforceability of Anti-Reverse Engineering Clauses in Licensing Agreements],
ZHISHI CHANQUAN FA YANJIU(知识产权法研究) [10 INTELL. PROP. RIGHT L. RSCH. 155,
155-56 (2013)]; Zhang Jiyu, supra note 25, at 60-61.
41
See generally Bender, Protection of Computer Programs: The Copyright/Trade
Secret Interface, supra note 9, at 910 (introducing a discussion of dual copyright-trade
secret protection).
42
Fan Buzhengdang Jingzheng Fa ( 反 不 正 当 竞 争 法 ) [Anti-Unfair
Competition Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong.,
Sept. 2, 1993, effective Dec. 1, 1993; revised by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s
Cong., Nov. 4, 2017; revised by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 23,
2019),
http://lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=30315&lib=law
[
https://perma.cc/8TQH-J7YV]; Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli Qinfan
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much in common with that in the United States concerning
protection requirements and infringement standards, partly because
the Chinese trade secrets system has developed under U.S. pressure
and influence. 43 Generally, trade secrets have certain advantages
over other IP rights. Unlike copyrights and patents, trade secrets
can last indefinitely. 44 Trade secrets can cover a wide range of
information or products, as long as they satisfy the statutory
requirements. 45
Trade secrets can protect unpatentable or
uncopyrightable information, so long as this information is kept
secret using reasonable measures, is not generally known or readily
ascertainable, and can bring independent value for the holders. 46
Software companies customarily keep the source code secret when
distributing or licensing software programs, disclosing only the
object code. 47 Such limited disclosure of object code satisfies the
secrecy requirement of trade secrets.48 As a result, the eligibility of
software programs for trade secrets protection is not in much
dispute. 49 Given that software programs are eligible for trade
Shangye Mimi Minshi Anjian Shiyong Falv Ruogan Wenti De Guiding, Fashi [2020]
Qi Hao (最高人民法院关于审理侵犯商业秘密民事案件适用法律若干问题的规定, 法
释【2020 】7 号) [Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues
Concerning the Application of Law in the Trial of Civil Cases Involving
Infringements upon Trade Secrets No. 7 [2020]] (promulgated by the Judicial
Comm. Sup. People’s Ct., Sept. 10, 2020, effective Sept. 12, 2020)
http://lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=34076&lib=law
[https://perma.cc/48XJ-LJU3].
43
Although certain procedural rules are very different, such as burden of
proof and evidence production, many substantive rules are indeed quite similar.
This is because China not only established the trade secrets system due to U.S.
pressure but also transplanted many rules from the United States. See Yang Chen,
Development of China’s Trade Secrets Law in the US’ Shadow: Negative Consequences for
China and Suggestions, 17 U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. 138 (2022). For a summary of
requirements of trade secrets protection in China, see KONG XIANGJUN,
FANBUZHENGDANG JINGZHENG FA XINYUANLI FENLUN (反不正当竞争法新原理分论)
[THE NEW PRINCIPLES OF ANTI-UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW: SUBSECTION, at 360-91
(2019)].
44
See Varadarajan, supra note 31, at 1412.
45
See Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1(4) (Unif. Law Comm’n 1985) [hereinafter
UTSA]; Katherine Linton, The Importance of Trade Secrets: New Directions in
International Trade Policy Making and Empirical Research, J. INT’L COM. & ECON. 1, 3
(2016).
46
See UTSA § 1(4); Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade
Secrets as IP Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 311, 317-18 (2008).
47
See LaRoque, supra note 5, at 430-31; Rice, supra note 12, at 596.
48
See LaRoque, supra note 5, at 438.
49
See, e.g., Shangye Mimi Baohu Guiding (Zhengqiu Yijian Gao) (商业秘密保
护规定（征求意见稿）) [Regulations on Trade Secrets Protection (Draft for Public
Comment)] (promulgated by the State Admin. Mkt. Regul., Sept. 4. 2020), art. 5,
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secrets-related protection, the trade secrets law can fill the gaps
created by copyright protection; it can protect components of
software programs that cannot be copyrighted, such as the
underlying ideas and functional elements. 50 This is why many
software companies adopt a copyright plus trade secrets approach
to protect their programs.51
Nevertheless, trade secrets law has one critical limitation—it
only protects against misappropriation. In other words, secrets
holders cannot rely on trade secrets law to prevent others from
obtaining and using trade secrets through proper means.52 Proper
means typically include independent development and reverse
engineering.53 Allowing reverse engineering in trade secrets law is
recognized as a significant limiting doctrine, which functions to
balance the rights holders’ protections and the public interest of

http://www.moj.gov.cn/pub/sfbgw/zlk/202009/t20200903_174476.html
[https://perma.cc/TL9N-6CL4] [hereinafter 2020 Administration Regulation
(Draft)] (recognizing software program source code as trade secrets); Anthony J.
Mahajan, Intellectual Property, Contracts, and Reverse Engineering after ProCD: A
Proposed Compromise for Computer Software, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 3297, 3307-08 (1999);
Risch, supra note 9, at 1649-50.
50
See Risch, supra note 9, at 1646.
51
See, e.g., Zhao Gang (赵刚), Shangyemimi Zuixin Sifa Jieshi Dui “Ruanjian”
Xiangguang Hangye Shangyemimi Bohu De Yingxiang Ji Jianyi (商业秘密最新司法解释
对”软件”相关行业商业秘密保护的影响及建议) [The Impact of the New Trade Secrets
Judicial Interpretation on Software Related Industry and Suggestions], ZHONG LUN (中伦
)
(Sept.
30.
2019),
http://www.zhonglun.com/Content/2020/0930/1658438832.html [https://perma.cc/9DBD-XVXT] (discussing the necessity for
software companies to use trade secrets to protect software programs, in addition
to mere copyright protection); Bender, Protection of Computer Programs: The
Copyright/Trade Secret Interface, supra note 9, at 910; id. at 1646-47; LaRoque, supra
note 5, at 435.
52
See Fan Buzhengdang Jingzheng Fa ( 反 不 正 当 竞 争 法 ) [Anti-Unfair
Competition Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong.,
Sept. 2, 1993, effective Dec. 1, 1993; revised by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s
Cong., Nov. 4, 2017; revised by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 23,
2019),
art.
9,
http://lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=30315&lib=law
[https://perma.cc/8TQH-J7YV]; UTSA § 1(1)-(2).
53
See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli Qinfan Shangye Mimi Minshi
Anjian Shiyong Falv Ruogan Wenti De Guiding, Fashi [2020] Qi Hao (最高人民法
院关于审理侵犯商业秘密民事案件适用法律若干问题的规定, 法释【2020】7 号)
[Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Concerning the
Application of Law in the Trial of Civil Cases Involving Infringements upon Trade
Secrets No. 7 [2020]] (promulgated by the Judicial Comm. Sup. People’s Ct., Sept.
10,
2020,
effective
Sept.
12,
2020),
Article
14,
http://lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=34076&lib=law
[https://perma.cc/48XJ-LJU3]; UTSA § 1, comment; 18 U.S.C.A. § 1839(6) (B) (West
Supp. 2016).
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using information for cumulative innovations.54 In China, the 2007
Judicial Interpretation of AUCL explicitly recognizes reverse
engineering as proper means for appropriating trade secrets.55 In
the United States, the Supreme Court even considers allowing
reverse engineering a rule designed to weaken trade secrets
protection, which is a reason why the trade secrets law is not
preempted by federal patent law.56
Since trade secrets law cannot prevent reverse engineering
conduct, it fails to fill this gap in copyright protection. Software
companies, therefore, often resort to contract law by including antireverse engineering clauses in licensing agreements.57 Sample antireverse engineering clauses in China state, “You may not . . .
[c]onduct reverse engineering, reverse assembly and reverse compiling on
the Software, or other attempt to discover the source code of the
Software.”58 This clause gives software companies broad authority
to control the behavior of end-users, far exceeding the rights granted
by IP laws. These prohibitory terms try to circumvent the built-in
limiting doctrines in IP rights and plausibly disrupt the sound
balance intended by these laws. Accordingly, it is valuable to
explore whether they are enforceable under current law and, if so,
whether they should be enforced in China.

54
See Du Kailin (杜开林), “Fanxiang Gongcheng Jinzhi Tiaokuan” De Xiaoli Yu
Shagnye Mimi Baohu (反向工程禁止条款”的效力与商业秘密保护) [The Effect of Antireverse Engineering Clauses and Protections for Trade Secrets], ZHONGGUO FAMING YU
ZHUANLI(中国发明与专利) [5 CHINESE INVENTIONS & PAT. 43, 44 (2005)] (China);
Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 4, at 1583-1584; Stephen J. Davidson, Reverse
Engineering and the Development of Compatible and Competitive Products Under United
States Law, 5 COMPUT. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 399, 401 (1989).
55
Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli Buzhengdang Jingzheng Minshi
Anjian Yingyong Falv Ruogan Wenti De Jieshi, Fashi [2007] No. 2 (最高人民法院关
于 审 理 不 正 当 竞 争 民 事 案 件 应 用 法 律 若 干 问 题 的 解 释 , 法 释 【 2007 】 2 号 )
[Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court on Some Issues Concerning the
Application of Law in the Trial of Civil Cases Involving Unfair Competition,
Judicial Interpretation [2007] No. 2] (promulgated by the Judicial Comm. Sup.
People’s Ct., Jan. 12, 2007, effective Feb. 1, 2007), art. 12,
https://www.pkulaw.com/en_law/e7b897dddc93e2fabdfb.html
[https://perma.cc/SXW4-7ZNV].
56
See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 489-90 (1974).
57
See supra notes 12-19 and accompanying text.
58
See WECHAT, supra note 17.
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III. DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS: CURRENT LEGAL STATUS IN CHINA
While software companies in China frequently include antireverse engineering in licensing agreements, 59 the position of
Chinese law on whether these terms are enforceable is less clear.
Cases directly dealing with the enforceability issue in China are
scant. One early case, however, partly touched this issue and can
provide some relevant insight.60 This case concerned a clause in the
licensing agreement which prohibited any reverse engineering,
decompiling, or disassembling of software programs, unless the
applicable law allowed the restricted behaviors. 61 The defendant
argued that since Chinese copyright law did not explicitly prohibit
reverse engineering and that doing so was his basic right, this
contract term unduly increased his liability and foreclosed his basic
right.62 Hence, he argued that such a term should be void.63 The
Beijing First Intermediate Court, however, rejected his argument
and upheld this term.64 It reasoned that, because the Chinese law
did not specifically prohibit the use of anti-reverse engineering
terms, the argument that such a term violated basic rights was not
persuasive.65
The reasoning of this court can thus provide certain insights
about the treatment of these prohibitory terms in China. The result
in this case seems to support the proposition that these terms are
enforceable in China. However, it is not that simple. The decision
does not set a precedent about the enforceability of anti-reverse
engineering clauses because it was not the main issue in this case.
The court’s decision is based on other standard terms included in
licensing agreements.66 There is only one sentence mentioning the

See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
See WeiruanGongsi Yu Guoli Deng Jisuanji Ruanjian Zhuzuoquan Xuke
Shiyong Hetong JiufenYian (微软公司与郭力等计算机著作权许可使用合同纠纷一
案 ) [Microsoft Co. v. Guo Li, A Dispute Over Computer Copyright Licensing
Contract Dispute] (Beijing High People’s Ct. June 20, 2013) (China),
http://bjgy.chinacourt.gov.cn/paper/detail/2013/07/id/1096065.shtml
[https://perma.cc/CS4P-MM5B].
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id.
59
60
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enforceability issue without any detailed reasonings.67 Also, it may
be argued that the enactment of the 2020 amendment of PRC
Copyright Law changed this aspect of the ruling as it now allows
circumventing technological measures to reverse engineer
software.68 Therefore, this case has limited precedential value for
courts. Based just on this early case, we cannot conclude that the
Chinese law allows enforcement of these prohibition terms.
Although few cases in China touch on the enforceability issue in
practice, academia has provided valuable arguments and insights
about whether these terms are enforceable based on Chinese policy
considerations. Most scholars argue that these prohibition terms
should be invalid based on the invalidity doctrine in contract law.69
The doctrine of contract invalidity in China is based on Article 52 of
the PRC Contract Law, which has been codified into Article 153 of
the new PRC Civil Code. 70 According to Article 52 of the PRC
Contract Law, any contract terms which conflict with the public
order and good customs (the first prong), or with mandatory
provisions in laws and regulations (the second prong), are invalid.71
However, differences exist among these scholars regarding how the
doctrine applies in invalidating anti-reverse engineering terms.
Some argue for using the public order and good customs prong (the
first prong) to invalidate these terms.72 They contend that, because
Id.
Zhuzuoquan Fa (著作权法) [Copyright Law] (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 7, 1990, rev’d Nov. 11, 2020, effective June. 1,
2021),
art.
50
https://www-pkulawcom.pennlaw.idm.oclc.org/en_law/59d1a94a76038c6cbdfb.html
[https://perma.cc/KK5J-B9EA].
69
See e.g., Zhang Jiyu, supra note 25, at 61; Caowei, supra note 39, at 24-25;
Chen Shan ( 陈 珊 ), Jinzhi Ruanjian Fanxiang Gongcheng Tiaokuan De Xiaoli
Yanjiu—Yi Fayi Baohu Wei Shijiao (禁止软件反向工程条款的效力研究——以法益
保 护 视 角 ) [Research on the Enforceability of Reverse Engineering Prohibition
Terms—From the Perspective of Protecting Legal Interests], Kaifeng Jiaoyu
Xueyuan Xuebao ( 开 封 教 育 学 院 学 报 ) [38 J. KAIFENG INST. EDUC. 242 (2018)];
QueZipeng, supra note 40, at 164-66.
70
Hetong Fa (合同法) [Contract Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 15, 1999, effective Oct. 1, 1999, invalidated by the Civil
Code,
Jan.
1,
2021),
art.
52,
http://lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=6145&lib=law
[https://perma.cc/DG9S-8X77]; codified into Minfa Dian (民法典) [Civil Code]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., May 28, 2020, effective
Jan. 1, 2021), art. 153, http://lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=32806&lib=law
[https://perma.cc/SX7N-4VCP].
71
Id.
72
See, e.g., Zhang Jiyu, supra note 25, at 61; Chen Shan, supra note 69, at 242.
67
68
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prohibitory terms protect those parts of programs that are not
copyrightable, these terms are at odds with the interest of the
public. 73 Such prohibitions amount to a patent-like protection
without passing high protection thresholds set by patent law and
thus erode the private-public balance set within.74 Thus, based on
the negative impact of these terms on public interest, these authors
argue that these terms are invalid because they harm the public
order and good customs.75 Some, nevertheless, argue for using the
prong of mandatory provisions of laws and regulations (the second
prong) to strike down these terms.76 They consider Article 17 of the
Regulation on Computers Software Protection as a mandatory
provision in the regulation.77 Since the contract terms are against
the mandatory provision of Article 17, they should be invalidated,
according to the doctrine of contract invalidity.78 In addition, others
who use this mandatory provision prong consider the provision
allowing reverse engineering in Chinese trade secrets law (Article 12
of 2007 Judicial Interpretation of AUCL) as mandatory provisions in
law. 79 According to their opinion, these prohibitory terms are
invalid because they directly conflict with 2007 Judicial
Interpretation of AUCL’s reverse engineering provision. 80 In this
regard, although all these authors support striking down these
terms using the same doctrine, disputes still exist as to how exactly
to invalidate them.
These disputes result from the inherent uncertainty and
vagueness of the contract invalidity doctrine in contract law, which
itself is much debated. 81 As a well-known Chinese contract law
scholar notes, the notion of public order and good customs is
inherently uncertain, with no clear definitions.82 It largely depends
on the judge in the disputed cases to interpret this notion and take
the policy considerations into account. How the judge will interpret
this notion in cases concerning anti-reverse engineering clauses is
See supra note 72.
See, e.g., Caowei, supra note 39, at 25.
75
Caowei, supra note 39, at 25.
76
See, e.g., QueZipeng, supra note 40, at 164-66.
77
QueZipeng, supra note 40, at 164-66.
78
QueZipeng, supra note 40, at 164-66.
79
See, e.g., Du Kailin supra note 54, at 44.
80
Du Kailin supra note 54, at 44.
81
See, e.g., HAN SHIYUAN (韩世远), HETONGFA ZONGLUN (合同法总论) [THE
LAW OF CONTRACTS] 228-29 (4th ed., 2018).
82
Id.
73
74
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unpredictable. Although these prohibitory clauses may disrupt the
patent and copyright law policy, they incentivize innovators to
create, which is also an important policy of IP laws. Thus, it remains
unclear as to how the courts may balance these equally important
policy considerations underlying IP laws in deciding whether these
terms harm public order and good customs. Similar problems exist
in the mandatory law and regulation prong. The scope of
mandatory provisions of laws and regulations is uncertain and
remains a complicated issue. Article 153 of new PRC Civil Code
provides that if the mandatory provision in the laws or regulations
does not render contracts invalid, then Article 153 does not apply.83
This leaves unsettled the question of which mandatory provision
Article 153 applies to. Many scholars have struggled to define the
mandatory provisions in laws and regulations under Article 153 and
provided quite complex standards in drawing the line.84 With such
a vague and unclear definition of mandatory provisions, it is
questionable whether courts may consider Article 17 of the
Regulation on Computers Software Protection or the 2007 Judicial
Interpretation of AUCL’s reverse engineering provision as
mandatory provisions as per Article 153 of the Civil Code. That
being said, using such a vague and largely debatable doctrine
reduces the persuasiveness of these authors’ arguments. It remains
unknown, in using this doctrine, how the court in the future may
consider the public policy issues concerned or whether the court will
consider the relevant Articles as mandatory provisions as per Article
153 of the Civil Code. Although the policy considerations
underlying these scholars’ arguments are reasonable, contract law’s
invalidity doctrine is too vague to solve the enforceability issue, as
it excessively relies on the unpredictable interpretations of courts.
The position of Chinese law on the enforceability of anti-reverse
engineering clauses is remarkably unclear. Though one case
discussed the issue, it was decided on entirely separate grounds.85
Moreover, the case has become outdated following the more recent
83
Minfa Dian (民法典) [Civil Code] (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat’l People’s Cong., May 28, 2020, effective Jan. 1, 2021), art. 153,
http://lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=32806&lib=law
[https://perma.cc/SX7N-4VCP].
84
See, e.g., Yang Daixiong (杨代雄), <Minfadian> Di 153 Tiao Diyi Kuan Pingzhu
(《民法典》第 153 条第 1 款评注) [Comments on the First Provision of the Article
153 of the Civil Code], Fazhi Yanjiu (法治研究) [5 RSCH. ON RULE L. 129, 129-32
(2020)] (classifying mandatory provisions in law and regulation into four types and
discussing whether each type is within the scope of Article 153).
85
See supra notes 60-68.
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legal developments in China. 86 Scholars have argued that these
terms are invalid because of the invalidity doctrine, but the inherent
vagueness and controversy surrounding this doctrine make it
uncertain how courts may apply it to invalidate these terms. Thus,
uncertainty persists in China about whether anti-reverse
engineering terms are enforceable. This uncertainty should be
resolved as soon as possible because “the public and private right
owners deserve to know in advance the precise level of proprietary
protection they can expect so that they may conduct themselves
accordingly.” 87 To deal with the uncertainty, other countries’
positions can provide valuable insights for potential reform
suggestions for China.
IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: CURRENT LEGAL STATUS IN THE
UNITED STATES AND EU
a.

A Threshold Question: Why the United States and EU?

An initial question that we should address before starting the
comparative analysis is why we should be comparing China with
the United States and the EU. One reason is that U.S. law
consistently affects the development of Chinese IP laws due to the
long-existing U.S.-China trade relations.88 Indeed, not only was the
first PRC Copyright Law promulgated due to a U.S.-China trade
deal,89 but also the Chinese trade secrets law develops in the shadow
of U.S. pressure and influence.90 With the inherent influence of U.S.
law on the Chinese IP laws, it is natural, when discussing reform
suggestions for IP issues in China, to see what the U.S. position is
and whether China can follow suit. Moreover, compared with the
uncertain Chinese position, the U.S. position is much clearer, and
the U.S. courts have already, in several cases, offered valuable policy

See supra notes 60-68.
Mahajan, supra note 49, at 3325.
88
See, e.g., Peter K. Yu, A Half-Century of Scholarship on the Chinese Intellectual
Property System, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 1045, 1065-70 (2018) (discussing U.S. influence on
the development of Chinese IP systems).
89
See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
90
See generally Chen, supra note 43 (discussing how China’s trade secrets law
developed under U.S. influence and pressure).
86
87
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considerations concerning this enforceability issue.91 Thus, there are
certainly valuable lessons for China to learn from U.S. law.
Furthermore, the EU has even more straightforward rules than the
United States as it has specific statutory provisions and cases
focusing on this issue.92 In this sense, exploring the United States
and EU positions can assist us in providing more reliable reform
suggestions for China.
b.

Anti-reverse Engineering Clauses in the United States

Most U.S. courts currently address the enforceability of antireverse engineering clauses through the preemption doctrine, which
holds that federal law prevails over any conflicting state law or
regulation93; they often ask, for example, whether federal copyright
law preempts the relevant state contract law. This is understandable
because anti-reverse engineering clauses prevent end users from
studying and using those components of software programs that
cannot be copyrighted.94 In this sense, state contract law seems to
create copyright-like exclusive rights over those elements that
cannot be copyrighted otherwise. In other words, the state contract
law, in essence, extends the federal copyright protection to
uncopyrightable elements. Thus, it is arguable that the federal
copyright law may preempt the state contract law in enforcing antireverse engineering clauses. To elaborate on this point, the first
section of this Part will discuss the enforceability issue under the
federal copyright law preemption doctrine. Apart from this, since
trade secrets law may also provide software companies a standalone cause of action, this Part will discuss the enforceability issue
under the federal trade secrets and federal patent laws as well.

See infra Part V.B.
See infra Part V.C.
93
NOAM SHEMTOV, BEYOND THE CODE: PROTECTION OF NON-TEXTUAL FEATURES
OF SOFTWARE 51 (2017).
94
See Jisuanji Ruanjian Baohu Tiaoli (计算机软件保护条例) [Regulation on
Computers Software Protection] (promulgated by State Council, Jan. 4, 1991,
effective Oct. 1, 1991, amended by State Council, Jan. 30, 2013, effective Mar. 1,
2013),
art.
17
and
accompanying
text,
https://www-pkulawcom.pennlaw.idm.oclc.org/en_law/41841820b1a1b74abdfb.html.
91
92
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Enforceability Under Federal Copyright Law

One notable case which turned down these anti-reverse
engineering clauses is Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd. Vault was
concerned with a state statute that explicitly allowed software
companies to include licensing terms to restrict, or even prohibit
altogether, reverse-engineering the object code.95 The Fifth Circuit
ruled that this statutory provision “clearly ‘touches upon an area’ of
federal copyright law,” making it preempted.96 As a result, the court
invalidated the anti-reverse engineering terms in Vault’s licensing
agreement.97 However, the Fifth Circuit did not provide detailed
reasoning for the preemption issue, and this case had special facts
that a state statute was concerned with. This has made Vault easily
distinguishable, thus enabling future courts to allow the
enforcement of limiting provisions. 98 Indeed, many courts after
Vault chose to uphold the terms by distinguishing with Vault.99
The Federal Circuit in Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., applying the
law of the First Circuit, upheld the prohibition on reverse
engineering in the license agreements.100 According to the law of the
First Circuit, preemption by federal copyright law did not apply if
“a state cause of action requires an extra element, beyond mere
copying, preparation of derivative works, performance, distribution
or display.”101 The law of the First Circuit allowed the enforcement
of state contractual rights, holding that the Copyright Act did not
preempt contract claims. 102 This is because contracts “generally
affect only their parties” and do not create “exclusive rights,” in
contrast to a copyright which is an exclusive right against the
world. 103 Since the state enforcement of contractual terms
prohibiting reverse engineering did not create an “exclusive right”
against the world, this court allowed the enforcement of these

Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 268-69 (5th Cir. 1988).
Id. at 270.
97
Id.
98
See e.g., Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003);
Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2005).
99
See supra note 98.
100
Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1322-23.
101
Id. at 1324 (emphasis added).
102
Id. at 1325.
103
Id.
95

96
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provisions. 104 The Federal Circuit distinguished this case from
Vault, noting that Vault was concerned with a state statute, while
this case was strictly solely about private contractual agreements.105
Since the prohibitory terms were upheld, this court supported the
claim of breach of contract.106
Although the dissenting opinion in Bowers objected to the ruling
and supported Vault on this issue, 107 other circuits showed a
propensity to follow Bowers rather than Vault. For example, the
Eighth Circuit, in Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, endorsed Bowers and
allowed the enforcement of anti-reverse engineering clauses.108 The
court distinguished the case from Vault for the same reason—Vault
was concerned with a state statute, while this case was about private
restrictions on reverse engineering in licensing agreements.109 The
Davidson court considered this case more similar to Bowers, where
end-users expressly relinquished the rights to reverse engineering
in license terms.110 Davidson thus endorsed the reasoning in Bowers
and enforced the contractual limitations.111
Although Vault remains good law in the Fifth Circuit, it is
frequently distinguished by other courts, as best illustrated by the
decisions of the Federal and Eighth Circuits.112 Prior relevant case
law reveals a trend of courts enforcing anti-reverse engineering
terms, at least under copyright law. Indeed, empirical evidence has
shown that the courts’ welcoming position has empowered software
companies to use anti-reverse engineering clauses in their terms of
services more frequently. 113 The analysis, however, does not end
here. Although, according to many courts, anti-reverse engineering
clauses do not touch on the exclusive area of federal copyright law,
they may, in certain circumstances, be directly in conflict with
federal trade secrets and patent laws. The analysis must therefore
consider the possibility of federal trade secrets or patent
preemption.
Id.
Id.
106
Id. at 1326.
107
Id. at 1335 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
108
422 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2005).
109
Id. at 639.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
See Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Davidson
& Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2005).
113
Marotta-Wurgler & Taylor, supra note 12, at 257.
104
105
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Enforceability Under Federal Trade Secrets Law

While no case currently touches on this issue, it remains possible
that such anti-reverse engineering clauses may be preempted by
federal trade secrets law, specifically the Defend Trade Secrets Act
(DTSA) of 2016. The DTSA expressly allows the reverse engineering
of trade secrets by excluding it from improper means.114 In light of
this language, it is questionable whether a contractual prohibition of
reverse engineering can withstand the preemption test of the DTSA.
The DTSA has a preemption exception, which states that it does not
“preempt or displace any other remedies, whether civil or criminal,
provided by [U.S.] Federal, State, commonwealth, possession, or
territory law for the misappropriation of a trade secret.”115 Arguably,
this preemption exception applies only to state trade secrets law
rather than others, such as state enforcement of contractual terms.116
Accordingly, it seems that the DTSA is likely to preempt the
enforcement of contractual bans on reverse engineering, since state
contract law is not explicitly included in the preemption exception.
Nevertheless, there is an argument that, even if this preemption
exception does include state contract law, courts may still enforce
anti-reverse engineering terms. This is because courts may still
follow the previous reasoning for preemption (see, for example,
Bowers), which considers trade secrets rights as rights against the
world, like copyright. 117 Following this logic, since contractual
rights are mere rights between parties rather than rights against the
world, contractual bans on reverse engineering do not fall within the
scope of the DTSA, which is concerned with rights against the
world.118 Therefore, such contractual bans would not be preempted
by the DTSA. This argument is becoming increasingly convincing,
since trade secrets are often considered a type of IP right, on the
same footing as copyright, patents, and trademarks. 119 With
114

376, 381.

Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, § 2(b)(6)(B), 130 Stat.

18 U.S.C.A. § 1838 (West Supp. 2016) (emphasis added).
See LaRoque, supra note 5, at 449-50.
117
Id. at 450. The Bowers court believed that the first circuit followed the
reasoning of ProCD and held that contracts do not create exclusive rights so that the
Copyright Act does not preempt contract claims. Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1324-25.
118
See LaRoque, supra note 5, at 450.
119
See e.g., Lemley, supra note 46, at 329-41; Varadarajan, supra note 31, at 141820; Eric Goldman, The Defend Trade Secrets Act Isn’t an ‘Intellectual Property’ Law, 33
SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 541 (2017) (arguing that DTSA should have explicitly
115
116
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increasing support for treating trade secrets as IP rights, courts are
more likely to adopt the view that trade secrets are exclusive rights,
like copyright, to validate contractual bans. Thus, while one can
reasonably argue against enforcement of these terms under DTSA,
such an argument may not ultimately be that strong.
iii. Enforceability Under Federal Patent Law
Although the result of a DTSA preemption analysis does not
figure to affect the copyright preemption result, patent preemption
analysis may make the enforceability of these prohibitory clauses
highly questionable. Patent preemption is the result of the
controversial relationship between trade secrets and patents. In
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., the Supreme Court held that state
trade secrets law was not preempted by the Federal Patent Law,
partly because trade secrets did not constitute an equivalent to
patents, since trade secrets offered much weaker protections. 120
Reverse engineering, according to the court’s opinion, functions
exactly like the limiting doctrine weakening the trade secrets
protection.121 In other words, it is fair to say that allowing reverse
engineering of trade secrets was a critical reason why the Supreme
Court upheld the trade secrets law in Kewanee. 122 Allowing the
enforcement of anti-reverse engineering clauses to supplement
trade secrets protections may make state law protections more
equivalent to patents. Therefore, it seems to be directly against the
ruling in Kewanee if reverse engineering can be effectively prohibited
by contractual terms. In other words, contractual bans on reverse
engineering are likely to be unenforceable following the Kewanee line
of thought.
Although no court after Kewanee has specifically discussed the
patent preemption issue of prohibitory terms on reverse
engineering, at least some courts have shown an inclination to
invalidate such terms based on patent preemption. In Bonito Boats,
Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., citing Kewanee, the court ruled that
recognized trade secrets as a type of IP); cf. Bone, supra note 30, at 248; Robert G.
Bone, The (Still) Shaky Foundations of Trade Secret Law, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1803 (2014)
(arguing against the view that trade secrets should be treated as IP rights).
120
416 U.S. 470, 489-90 (1974).
121
See id. at 489-92.
122
Rice, supra note 12, at 623.
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the relevant state law, which prohibited reverse engineering a
product in the public domain, was preempted by federal patent
law. 123 The court reasoned that the right to prohibit reverse
engineering was “one of the rights vested in the federal patent
holder, but has never been a part of state protection . . . .” 124
Notwithstanding the fact that Bonito does not directly touch the
enforceability issue of contractual terms, its reasoning arguably
shows that bans on reverse engineering, regardless of their form, are
governed exclusively by federal patent law, which state laws should
not contravene.
While no case has directly ruled on the enforceability of
contractual prohibitions on reverse engineering under federal
patent law, influential cases such as Kewanee and Bonito offer ample
room for invalidating these contractual bans based on patent
preemption. However, the subject matter covered in Kewanee and
Bonito is not directly related to the software industry. Kewanee and
Bonito addressed the enforceability issue in the traditional
manufacturing industry,125 which is very different from the newly
developed software industry. The software industry has many
special features (for example, it is more incremental and cumulative
than traditional manufacturing industries) that we should take into
consideration in the legal analysis.126 It is not appropriate to make
the direct inference that the rules and reasoning in cases related to
other traditional industries can wholly apply to a quite different and
relatively new industry.127
The question of the extent to which the law should regulate
reverse engineering or allow private ordering on reverse
engineering may better be answered in each industry’s context. 128
Reverse engineering is justified to the extent that a sufficient lead
time is preserved for rights holders, while reserving ample room for
later entrants to author cumulative innovations.129 For example, it
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 160 (1989).
Id.
125
See Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 470; Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 144-45.
126
Samuelson et al., supra note 33, 2330-32; LaRoque, supra note 5, at 439-40.
127
For an argument that rules concerning reverse engineering should
differentiate from industries, see generally Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 4.
128
See generally Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 4 (discussing the economic
soundness of regulations on reverse engineering in each industry and promoting
for different treatment of reverse engineering in different industries).
129
See Rice, supra note 12, 570-71; Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 4, at
1649-50.
123

124
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seems more suitable to allow private prohibitions on reverse
engineering if competitors may easily reverse engineer, thus
providing sufficient lead time for rights holders. However, these
prohibitions should not provide rights holders with indefinite
control over information embedded in their products, fully
precluding the public’s use and benefit. At what point this balance
should lie differs across industries (for example, traditional
manufacturing industries, computer software industry).
The software industry has special features we must take into
consideration. First, the software industry is incremental and
cumulative, such that programmers not only contribute to, but also
benefit from, the innovation process. 130 Since software products
“almost invariably contain admixtures of old and new elements,”
this weighs in favor of finding that allowing a total contractual ban
on reverse engineering would not be a sound practice in the
software industry. 131 Another notable feature of the software
industry is that technological development has gradually made
reverse engineering software programs increasingly easier and
cheaper, leaving rights holders much less lead time. 132 A
straightforward invalidation of anti-reverse engineering clauses
may disrupt right holders’ incentives to innovate to an unjustifiable
degree.
Applied to the patent preemption point and considering the
unique context of the software industry, courts may apply Kewanee
or Bonito in modified ways to account for specific industry needs.
First, the enforcement of a total contractual ban on reverse
engineering for any purpose is likely to be held as preempted by
federal patent law. One reason is that such a ban would effectively
create an absolute and indefinite right for software program
creators. This would upset the balance between granting monopoly
rights and upholding the public’s needs for information. Moreover,
it would directly conflict with the ruling in Bonito.133 Another reason
is that such a ban may destroy the industry’s demands for
cumulative innovations and thus result in overly negative policy
implications. Therefore, a total ban on reverse engineering in the
software industry cannot survive the preemption test under Kewanee
or Bonito Boats, just as in the traditional manufacturing industry.
130
131
132
133

Samuelson et al., supra note 33, at 2330-32.
Samuelson et al., supra note 33, at 2332.
See LaRoque, supra note 5, at 439-40.
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 157-58 (1989).
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Nevertheless, given that current software reverse engineering
technology has eroded much of the lead time enjoyed by the
program creators, courts may aim to partly distinguish cases in the
software industry with Kewanee or Bonito, which is in the
manufacturing industry. Courts may show more sympathy for antireverse engineering clauses in the software industry, so long as they
do not go too far. For example, a limited contractual ban on reverse
engineering programs may be more likely to pass the patent
preemption test than a total ban. One example of a limited ban
would be a contractual limitation on reverse engineering for
producing directly competing programs.134 This contract term does
not preclude reverse engineering for other purposes, such as
interoperability or research and study. 135 Such a limited ban is
arguably more likely to pass the patent preemption test of Kewanee
or Bonito because it preserves a sufficient lead time for software
companies by deterring reverse engineering for direct competition
while reserving enough room for the public to reverse engineer for
other purposes such as cumulative innovations.136 This limited ban
does not disrupt the patent law’s balance and the software
industry’s cumulative nature. Therefore, while a total contractual
ban is likely to be invalid, such a limited ban may be plausibly
upheld.
iv. Summary and Insights
Although the position of U.S. law on the enforceability issue of
anti-reverse engineering clauses is complex and often ambiguous,
some concrete observations can be made. Cases under federal
copyright preemption show that these prohibitory terms are not
preempted by federal copyright law.
Federal trade secrets
preemption does not seem to change the enforceability of their limits
either, as the argument for DTSA preemption is quite weak. Federal
patent law preemption, however, may render anti-reverse
engineering clauses unenforceable, as they may unduly disrupt the
federal patent law policy in balancing monopoly rights with public
benefit of access to the information (i.e., cumulative innovations).

134
135
136

LaRoque, supra note 5, at 453.
LaRoque, supra note 5, at 453.
LaRoque, supra note 5, at 453-55.
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Nevertheless, considering the unique landscape of the software
industry, courts may not adopt a one-size-fits-all approach in
dealing with the enforceability issue. Plausible predictions can be
made based on previous rulings on patent preemption cases in
traditional manufacturing industry. For example, in recognizing the
special needs and situations of the software industry, courts are
more likely to invalidate the total contractual bans on reverse
engineering, while enforcing the limited bans.
The descriptive analyses and predictions of the enforceability of
anti-reverse engineering clauses under U.S. law can inform an
effective normative analysis of reform suggestions for China, as the
enforceability issue in China shares many common policy
implications and choices with that in the United States. Before
discussing normative suggestions and how exactly this descriptive
analysis in the United States helps the normative analysis, the
following section will then discuss the EU position on this
enforceability issue and explore what additional insights the EU law
can bring to the normative analysis.
c.

Anti-reverse Engineering Clauses in the EU

The EU law recognizes two forms of reverse engineering—
“black box” reverse engineering and decompilation.137 “Black box”
reverse engineering means running and loading a software program
to study and research the program so as to uncover the ideas and
principles underlying the program. 138 Article 5(3) of the EU
Computer Programs Directive clearly exempts this type of reverse
engineering from copyright infringement. 139 Article 8 of this
Directive clearly prohibits any contractual provisions to the
contrary. 140 Thus, under the EU law, contractual limitations on
reverse engineering for research and study purposes are not
enforceable. Moreover, the EU law exempts any decompilation acts
attempting to transfer the object code of the program to the source
code for interoperability purposes. 141 In other words, end-users
have the rights to decompile a software program to obtain the
137
138
139
140
141

See SHEMTOV, supra note 93, at 72-73.
See SHEMTOV, supra note 93, at 71.
Council Directive 2009/24, art. 5(3), 2009 O.J. (L 111) 16, 19 (EC).
Council Directive 2009/24, art. 8, 2009 O.J. (L 111) 16, 19 (EC).
Council Directive 2009/24, art. 6, 2009 O.J. (L 111) 16, 19 (EC).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol43/iss3/4

2022]

Enforceability of Anti-Reverse Engineering Clauses

811

underlying interface information,142 which allows users to develop
compatible applications. Again, this right to decompile for
achieving interoperability cannot be waived contractually. 143 In
summary, the EU law explicitly disallows any prohibitive contract
terms on reverse engineering for research and study purposes or for
achieving interoperability. Reverse engineering for other purposes
may amount to copyright infringement, and software companies are
certainly free to include relevant limiting terms in licensing
agreements to add the protection.144
The policy rationales backing these straightforward rules are
evident. Firstly, they aim to protect the public interest to view, use,
and study the ideas of a program while preserving enough rights for
program owners. 145 Secondly, they promote interoperability to
deter platform monopolies that do not benefit consumer welfare.146
This is because reverse engineering for interoperability is normally
intended to obtain the application programming interfaces (APIs) of
platforms, so as to develop compatible applications. 147 Without
reverse engineering, application developers have to accept the strict
and less-friendly terms provided by platforms, such as agreeing not
to run applications on rival platforms, which gives platform holders
excessive power in the market. 148 This arrangement unduly
dampens the incentives of developers to create new applications
and benefits platform holders.
Although allowing reverse
engineering for interoperability may slightly affect the monopoly
rights enjoyed by rights holders and, in turn, negatively impact the
incentives to develop platforms, it increases incentives to develop
applications and improves competition in the platform market. On
balance, public welfare benefits more from allowing reverse
engineering for interoperability because consumers can enjoy more
applications in different platforms and the system price of platforms
may be lower in the long run due to the enhanced competition.149
Reform suggestions for the Chinese law can shed much light on
these straightforward rules and their underlying policy
See SHEMTOV, supra note 93, at 80.
Council Directive 2009/24, art. 8, 2009 O.J. (L 111) 16, 19 (EC).
144
See SHEMTOV, supra note 93, at 72-73 (noting that it is only decompilation to
achieve interoperability that might be excused).
145
See SHEMTOV, supra note 93, at 83-84.
146
See SHEMTOV, supra note 93, at 79-80.
147
See Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 4, at 1615-16.
148
See Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 4, at 1617-18.
149
See Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 4, at 1621.
142
143
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considerations. The next Part, thus, will further the comparative
analysis by providing reform proposals for China based on the
insights from the U.S. and EU positions.
V. LEGAL REFORM SUGGESTIONS FOR CHINA: AN INTERMEDIATE
APPROACH
Before normatively discussing suggestions concerning Chinese
legal reform on anti-reverse engineering clauses, a threshold
question must be addressed: which forum should be relied upon to deal
with the uncertainty of this legal issue? This Article considers that, to
eliminate the uncertainty, courts are not an ideal venue. This is
because different courts may adopt inconsistent or contradictory
approaches, which may actually add to the uncertainty. The
situation is even more serious in China, which is not a common law
country. This means that Chinese courts should normally base their
decisions on statutes, rather than previous case laws.150 The most
plausible doctrine which Chinese courts may use is the contract law
validity doctrine.
However, it is inherently vague and
undetermined. 151 Therefore, it is more appropriate for China to
follow the EU to adopt explicit provisions in either statutes or
judicial interpretations rather than relying on courts in individual
cases.

150
The situations may have slightly changed after the SPC’s issuance of the
“Guiding Opinions of the Supreme People’s Court on Unifying the Application of
Laws to Strengthen the Retrieval of Similar Cases (for Trial Implementation)”,
which requires courts in certain cases (normally complex cases) to do a preemptive
search for similar cases from higher courts (or cases these courts themselves decide)
and follow suit. See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Tongyi Falv Shiyong Jiaqiang
Leian Jiansuo De Zhidao Yijian (Shixing) (最高人民法院关于统一法律适用加强类案
检 索 的 指导 意见 ( 试行 )) [Guiding Opinions of the Supreme People’s Court on
Unifying the Application of Laws to Strengthen the Retrieval of Similar Cases (for
Trial Implementation)] (promulgated by the Judicial Comm. Sup. People’s Ct., July
1,
2020,
effective
Jul.
31,
2020),
https://www.pkulaw.com/en_law/0749b01d6f2da00dbdfb.html
[https://perma.cc/J37S-4DRR]. However, statutes still remain the main source for
each case and this judicial guiding opinion only applies to a limited scope of cases.
151
See supra Part III.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol43/iss3/4

2022]
a.

Enforceability of Anti-Reverse Engineering Clauses

813

The One-Size-Fits-All Approach is Not Appropriate for China

A possible approach to deal with anti-reverse engineering
clauses is adopting the one-size-fits-all treatment for these clauses: a
straightforward provision prohibiting the use of anti-reverse
engineering clauses or allowing their use, regardless of what
purpose the reverse engineering is for. Nevertheless, this Article
argues that the one-size-fits-all approach does not suit the Chinese
context. The first choice may be enforcing these terms, regardless of
what type of reverse engineering behaviors are prohibited. If we
look solely at copyright preemption cases, U.S. law supports this
choice. 152 As previous U.S. copyright preemption cases indicate,
state contract law should be respected. By respecting state contract
law, one of the embedded purposes of U.S. courts is to respect the
freedom of contract.153 Considering the importance of the freedom
of contract, it seems sound for China to allow parties to freely decide
what rights are limited and what are granted. Freedom of contract,
however, should not be boundless. When there are sufficient
reasons, such as important policy considerations like the public
interest, it is justifiable that the law partly restricts contract freedom.
Further, in the software licensing context, it is doubtful whether the
signing of licensing agreements is truly free. Standard licensing
terms or, more specifically, “click-wrap” terms, are always used in
the software licensing scenario, which means that normally end
users do not have the negotiating power to amend or change any
boilerplate terms, but only accept all or refrain from using the
software. 154 It is thus premature for China to simply follow the
current U.S. position under the copyright preemption cases to allow
enforcement of these terms. This Article proposes that China should
follow the EU position to at least disallow certain limiting terms
based on policy considerations. Indeed, allowing unrestricted
enforcement of these prohibitory terms disrupts the balance set by
current IP laws. Unlimited contract rights combined with IP rights
may result in exclusionary overprotection, which overly restricts
See supra Part IV.B.i.
See, e.g., Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1325-26 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (“[C]ase law indicates the First Circuit would find that private parties are free
to contractually forego the limited ability to reverse engineer a software product
under the exemptions of the Copyright Act.”).
154
See generally Marotta-Wurgler & Taylor, supra note 12 (using software end
user licensing agreement, which is a common standard contract, to empirically
assess whether these standard contracts change over time).
152
153
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public use of information and discourages cumulative innovations
such as investment in improving programs.155 Since the software
industry largely relies on incremental and cumulative
innovations, 156 the one-size-fits-all approach of unrestrictedly
enforcing anti-reverse engineering terms is not sound. In addition,
the software industry in China is still in a phase that has relatively
more needs for referencing and learning for cumulative innovations,
compared to the much-developed U.S. software industry. 157
Allowing unlimited enforcement of these terms is not justified in
China, considering its significant negative impact on public
interests. Therefore, it is more reasonable for China to follow the EU
to prevent some types of reverse engineering ends, such as for
research, study, and interoperability, from contractual limitations.
Arguing against a wholly friendly approach toward these terms
does not mean that the other extreme should be adopted instead. If
Kewanee and Bonito are strictly interpreted and followed, the U.S.
patent preemption analysis may strike down all kinds of antireverse engineering terms, since they disrupt patent law policy.158
China, however, should not go to this extreme either. Software
program reverse engineering technology has become highly
developed, making reverse engineering programs increasingly
cheaper and easier. 159 For example, Genshin Impact, a popular
open-world game developed by a Chinese company, is easily
reverse engineered by players, resulting in the public leakage of
much undisclosed information (for example, new characters and
new events).160 In light of this, it seems more reasonable that certain
contractual limitations adopted by software companies be enforced.
Otherwise, there may be under-protection problems, leading to

155
156

3327-28.

See Rice, supra note 12, at 557.
See Samuelson et al., supra note 33, at 2330-32; Mahajan, supra note 49, at

See Chen Shan, supra note 69, at 241.
See supra Part IV.B.iii.
159
See LaRoque, supra note 5, at 439-40.
160
For reverse engineering of this game by players outside China, see Reverse
Engineering Adventures: Brute-force function search, or how to crack Genshin Impact with
PowerShell,
KATY’S
CODE
(Jan.
24,
2021),
https://katyscode.wordpress.com/2021/01/24/reverse-engineering-adventuresbrute-force-function-search-or-how-to-crack-genshin-impact-with-powershell/
[https://perma.cc/7BJ2-USZC] (offering a guide on how to reverse engineer
Genshin Impact). Indeed, reverse engineers will release any new information about
the new version of this game far before it is officially released.
157

158
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underinvestment in innovations.161 Accordingly, the one-size-fitsall approach, in either extreme position, should not be adopted in
Chinese legislation. The more reasonable and optimal approach
would lie somewhere between the two extremes. Rejecting this onesize-fits-all approach is consistent with the EU position, which
adopts an intermediate approach to maintain a sound private-public
interest. 162 Also, if Kewanee and Bonito are interpreted to
accommodate the software industry features, the U.S. patent
preemption analysis may support limited contractual bans on
reverse engineering, while disallowing a total ban.163 In light of the
U.S. and EU analysis, this Article argues that it is more appropriate
for China to adopt an intermediate approach to allow limited
contractual bans, while invalidating a total restriction.
b.

Toward an Intermediate Approach

Previous discussions have shown that an intermediate approach
to allow limited bans on reverse engineering is a more appropriate
choice for China. The remaining question is what limited
contractual limitations can or cannot be enforced. This largely
depends on whether allowing or invalidating bans on particular
types of reverse engineering can maintain a sound balance between
private rights and public interest. Reverse engineering software
programs can be classified into many types. The most frequent and
common types include: (1) for pure research and study; (2) to
achieve interoperability or compatibility; (3) to develop and market
a competing product (imitation); and (4) to develop and market an
improved product.164 It is relatively easier to discuss the contractual
limitations on the first two types. First, reverse engineering for
personal study and research purposes does not have any impact on
the software companies’ market. This behavior is limited to reverse
engineers’ personal use, and it does not produce any new or
competing programs. Since this type of conduct does not erode the
lead time enjoyed by software companies, there is no justification to
allow companies to use contract terms to limit them. Otherwise, the
public interest in using the underlying information may be
161
162
163
164

See Rice, supra note 12, at 557.
See supra Part IV.C.
See supra Part IV.B.iii.
See Rice, supra note 12, at 555-56; Mahajan, supra note 49, at 3314-15.
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excessively disrupted. That is the reason why the EU law disallows
companies to limit this conduct through contracts.165 In this regard,
China can follow the EU position. Second, reverse engineering for
interoperability or compatibility is economically sound. It promotes
interoperability to prevent platform monopolies that harm
consumer welfare. 166 That is why the EU law exempts reverse
engineering for interoperability and makes it a non-waivable
right. 167 Drawing insights from the EU rule and its underlying
policy rationales, the Chinese law should also not enforce antireverse engineering clauses on interoperability or compatibility.
Regarding reverse engineering to develop and market a
competing product (imitation), this can be prohibited by licensing
terms freely. Considering the current technology for reverse
engineering, if reverse engineers can freely use the information to
quickly develop and market a competing or functionally equivalent
product, the lead time enjoyed by software companies is
significantly eroded. Since reverse engineering costs are decreasing
due to the advancement of technology, reverse engineers can charge
lower prices when marketing the competitive product, largely
eroding the market share of the rights holders. This may negatively
impact the creative incentives of rights holders. Therefore, to retain
a justifiable private-public balance, it seems more appropriate to
allow enforcement of limited contractual restrictions on reverse
engineering for direct competition in China, similar to the U.S.
position where the analysis of patent preemption, considering
software industry features, seems to be more supportive for these
limited contractual bans.168
The enforceability of contractual bans on reverse engineering to
develop and market an improved product is more complicated. For
one thing, allowing reverse engineering for producing and
marketing an improved product may erode the market share of
rights holders, since the improved products can be said to directly
compete with the original ones. For another, innovating around the
original software programs is not similar to just producing
functionally equivalent products. The former adds more to the
public welfare, as it provides new and better programs to
consumers, although it directly competes with the original program
165
166
167
168

See supra Part IV.C.
See id.
See id.
See supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text.
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developers. The latter does not provide any new products to the
public and has an even more critical effect on the marketing of the
original programs. That said, it seems that the interest of the original
creators and the needs for cumulative innovations are in a deadlock.
How the law in China should choose its position depends largely on
which interest or need the Chinese law should prioritize. As seen in
the United States, the preemption doctrine on the enforceability of
anti-reverse engineering clauses should consider industry
features.169 The same is true for China, when deciding whether to
allow contractual bans on this kind of reverse engineering. The
software industry largely relies on incremental and cumulative
innovations to develop.170 Accordingly, considering this industry
feature, it seems more appropriate if the law favors the need for
cumulative innovations more, to invalidate any contract bans on
reverse engineering for producing improved products. This
position is even more appropriate, considering that the Chinese
software industry is still not that developed, which requires greater
room for cumulative innovations.171 What makes this position more
justified is that, if these contractual bans are not allowed, the original
creators may have more incentives to improve their current
programs, rather than simply resting on the monopoly rights of their
original programs. Therefore, this Article argues against the
Chinese law allowing anti-reverse engineering if the pertinent
clauses restrict the conduct that leads to product improvement.
c.

Summary and Steps Going Forward

Based on the comparative insights from the U.S. and EU laws,
this Article argues that the Chinese law should be reformed to
incorporate clear provisions to invalidate contractual bans on
reverse engineering for research and study, interoperability or
compatibility, and innovating around original programs. However,
See supra Part IV.
See supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
171
Although the Chinese software industry has developed very quickly
during recent years, it is still not that competitive in the international market
compared with other countries such as the Indian software industry. See
Xiangdong Chen, Ruixi Li, Miaochen Lv, Dian Chen & Lingzi Yang, Information
Technology Industry in China, in INNOVATION, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN INDIA AND CHINA 71, 81 (Kung-Chuang Liu & Uday S.
Racherla eds., 2019).
169
170
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the private bans on reverse engineering for producing and
marketing functionally equivalent programs should be upheld. In
addition to these clear provisions, a forward-looking approach
should take potential future reverse engineering behaviors into
account. Thus, there should be a miscellaneous provision allowing
courts flexibility in dealing with contractual bans on reverse
engineering for new purposes, based on policy considerations on a
case-to-case basis, 172 since there is a possibility that reverse
engineers may decompile or disassemble programs for other new
purposes in the future. In the short term, these clear provisions plus
the miscellaneous provision on the enforceability issue can be
included in the Regulation on Computers Software Protection. In
the long run, when situations become more mature, these provisions
can be incorporated into the PRC Copyright Law or even the Trade
Secrets Law (AUCL or its corresponding judicial interpretations),
depending on the legislative agenda and process.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article explored the current intellectual protections for
software programs in China and introduced the limits of the
exclusive rights software companies frequently use the contract law
to remedy. The anti-reverse engineering clause is a typical example
of companies’ efforts to supplement IP protections for software
programs. The enforceability of these terms is a critical issue, which
disrupts the balance set by IP laws. The descriptive analysis of the
Chinese position on this enforceability issue reveals that significant
uncertainty exists in the legal treatment of these terms. Reforms are
necessary to alleviate the uncertainty. This Article conducted the
comparative analysis by exploring the U.S. and EU positions of this
enforceability issue to provide valuable insights and policy
implications for our discussions on the Chinese reform suggestions.
Ultimately, Chinese law should be reformed to include clear
provisions allowing limited contractual bans, but disallowing total
bans. Moreover, a miscellaneous provision should be included to fit

172
See Fei Yanying (费艳颖)& Zhou Wenkang (周文康), Shangye Mimi Fanxiang
Gongcheng De Gongneng, Guanxi Yu Lujing Tanxi(商业秘密反向工程的功能、关系与
路径探析 ) [Probe Into the Function, Relationship and Path Behind the Trade Secrets
Reverse Engineering], 1 SCI. TECH.& L.(CHINESE-ENG. VERSION) 75 (2021).
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in with the rapid development of the software industry and deal
with potential future conducts.
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